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The Unnoticed Apogee of Atlanticism? 
US-Western European Relations During the Early Reagan Era 
 
The 1980s did not start well for Western Europe.  In domestic political terms the era 
was one of acute polarization, with Britain, France and Germany all riven by intense 
ideological competition.1   This left-wing, right-wing battle took place, moreover, 
against a backdrop of acute economic downturn.  In most European economies, the 
new decade did not bring the end of the problems that had beset the global economy 
during the 1970s, but instead their prolongation, with growth anaemic or absent 
altogether and unemployment remaining stubbornly high if not still rising.  Western 
Europe’s predicament, furthermore, was made worse by the contrast between its 
ongoing economic stagnation and the renewed growth of its principal international 
competitors, the United States and Japan.  It may have been ‘morning in America’, 
but on the other side of the Atlantic dawn showed no sign of breaking.2  For a 
continent that had grown accustomed in the course of the 1950s, 1960s and early 
1970s to higher growth rates than the Americans this was frustrating indeed, as was 
the seemingly inexorable rise of the Japanese economy which had overtaken Germany 
as the capitalist world’s second largest in the course of the previous decade.3 
 The early 1980s are also generally perceived to have been a time of stagnation 
as far as European integration was concerned.  A reasonably strong Commission 
Presidency under Roy Jenkins was followed from 1980 by a much weaker period of 
leadership under Gaston Thorn.  The Council of Ministers meanwhile still seemed 
leaden in its decision-making and prone to total impasse.4  A greater use of qualified 
majority voting (q.m.v.) was widely canvassed as the solution to this problem, but 
there seemed little short term prospect of this happening.  Both France and the new 
member states, Britain in particular, seemed wedded to a rather dogmatic (and 
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historically questionable) interpretation of the Luxembourg Compromise which 
greatly limited the scope for q.m.v. and there was no consensus for actual treaty 
change.5  And the European Council also struggled for direction, losing much time 
over the question of Britain’s budgetary contribution.6  This row proved highly time 
consuming and acrimonious, despite the relatively small size of the actual sums 
involved, and the irrelevance of this dispute to the much broader and more crucial 
question of what the EC could contribute to Western Europe’s recovery.  Overall, the 
European Community of the early 1980s seemed to have little chance of providing the 
answer to the region’s deep economic difficulties. 
 Nor were Transatlantic relations that much better, according to the traditional 
account at least.7 Part of the discord sprang from a record number of trade disputes 
between the EC and the Reagan Administration, the subject of Duccio Basosi’s 
contribution to this volume.  At a more fundamental level, however, the difficulties 
reflected a serious divergence between Washington and most European capitals in 
both economic policy and approach to the cold war.  The economic priorities of 
Reagan’s America thus differed markedly from most European governments 
(Thatcher’s Britain would be a partial exception) and a similar gap had opened up in 
readings of the cold war.  Whereas the American priority in the early 1980s seem to 
be to adopt a newly forceful, if not confrontational, stance towards the Soviet Union 
even at the expense of a serious increase in East-West tension, most Western 
European states sought instead to maintain important elements of the European 
détente of the 1970s.8  Reconciling such divergent goals would not prove to be an 
easy matter.  And to make matters worse, Reagan’s public image in Europe replete 
with suggestions that the former actor was an ignorant and dangerous ‘cowboy’, 
intent on taking the world to the edge of nuclear war, only increased the pressure on 
European governments, especially those of the centre-left, to distance themselves 
from Washington. 
                                                 
5
 For an attempt to debunk this interpretation by one of the authors of the original compromise, see 
Rolf Lahr, ‘Die Legende vom "Luxemburger Kompromiß"’, Europa-Archiv, vol.38, no.8, 1983 
6
 Stephen Wall, A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), pp. 1-17 
7
 Geir Lundestad, Empire by Integration: the United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
8
 For the US approach, see Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet 
Union and The Cold War (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007), pp.339-365 
 This chapter will not seek dramatically to overturn this picture of either 
European or Transatlantic affairs.  Indeed the opening section will confirm the 
existence of a number of important divergences between the incoming US 
administration and its principal European allies.  It will also confirm Reagan’s 
European image problem.  Based on the first crop of archival releases relating to the 
early 1980s, primarily from the Reagan Presidential Library in California the chapter 
will, however, seek to add a level of nuance and complexity to this account.  It will 
thus suggest that despite the periodic Transatlantic disputes that punctuate the period, 
some of the underlying mechanics of the partnership between the United States and 
their principal Western European allies continued to work surprisingly smoothly, both 
bilaterally and multilaterally.  Unlike some early periods of Transatlantic discord, in 
other words, disputes over substance did not feed through into rows about how 
Transatlantic dialogue should be conducted. Second it will argue that the very 
complexity of interchange and interaction between the two sides of the Atlantic, 
involving as it did a huge array of different institutional links, makes it vital for any 
historian seeking to arrive at a balanced judgement of Transatlantic ties to look 
beyond the headline grabbing personal relationships between Reagan and his 
European counterparts.  And third it will suggest that the structures of Transatlantic 
cooperation during this period were actually extraordinarily favourable to European 
influence in Washington during this period.  The periodic complaints of European 
leaders who believed that Reagan’s America paid little heed to their interests and was 
indeed growing away from the ‘old world’ do therefore need to be taken with more 
than a pinch of salt. 
 
West-West Tension over East-West Conflict 
At the heart of political tensions that characterised Transatlantic relations during the 
early Reagan years was a basic divergence in cold war tactics.  This in turn was 
aggravated by a mismatch in the general political cycles of several of the key Western 
powers, with the United States and Britain moving to the right well before West 
Germany did the same, and France moving in the opposite direction entirely.  The 
replacement of the centrist Valéry Giscard d’Estaing – the ‘most pro-American 
French leader since World War II’ according to Helmut Schmidt, the German 
Chancellor9 – with François Mitterrand whose Socialist led coalition government 
initially also included several communist ministers was bound to complicate 
Transatlantic relations.10  And the degree of West-West misunderstanding was 
increased still further by the very different levels of trade with Eastern Europe carried 
out by the United States and its main European partners.  Cold war gestures that made 
political sense in Washington and carried an acceptable level of economic cost, were 
much harder to swallow for Western European countries intent on increasing their 
foreign trade outlets not contracting them. 
 The leaders of Western Europe were not unaware of the rise in East-West 
tension during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  On the contrary, as Schmidt never 
tired of reminding the Americans, he had been much faster than the Carter 
Administration to recognise the threat to European security constituted by the 
deployment of a new generation of intermediate range Soviet nuclear missiles (the 
famous SS-20s), and had expended a huge amount of political capital in pushing for 
an effective western response.11  This had eventually arrived in the form of the 
December 1979 ‘double track’ decision, which committed NATO to deploying a new 
generation of American intermediate range missiles in Europe (the Cruise and 
Pershing II missiles) while simultaneously seeking to remove the SS-20s through 
disarmament talks with Moscow thereby making the Cruise and Pershings 
unnecessary.12  Similarly, all of the European governments recognised that Soviet 
actions in Afghanistan in 1979 and in Poland during the last months of 1981 
constituted serious cold war crises to which the West needed to respond.13  Where 
differences arose, however, was in deciding how to respond. 
 In the United States the whole process of détente had become publicly 
tarnished, viewed by many as relaxation in cold war tension that the Soviet Union had 
cunningly exploited in order to strengthen itself militarily and seize new opportunities 
for expansion in the Third World.  As a presidential candidate in both 1976 and 1980 
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Reagan had been particularly critical of détente, leading President Gerald Ford, for 
instance, to ban the use of the word in the course of his unsuccessful campaign for re-
election.14  In his very first press conference upon becoming President in 1981, 
Reagan dismissed détente as ‘a one-way street that the Soviet Union has used to 
pursue its own aims’.15  Unsurprisingly, therefore, Reagan had no incentive to talk of 
détente once he began to set the course of US foreign policy.  On the contrary, many 
of his most forthright champions amongst the American conservative movement 
strongly applauded his critical rhetoric towards the Soviet Union and praised him for 
not going out of his way to talk to his Russian counterparts.  Summit meetings, many 
US conservatives feared, were simply opportunities for wily Soviet leaders to play 
upon the many pressures felt by a democratic western leader and to trick the West into 
unnecessary concessions.16  It was therefore no accident that there were no US-Soviet 
summits in the course of Reagan’s first term.  In Western Europe, by contrast, there 
had been much less of a backlash against détente.  Indeed the prestige of the 
Ostpolitik process that had normalised the Federal Republic’s relations with Eastern 
Europe and with East Germany in particular, and of that other apogee of European 
détente, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), remained 
generally high.  The disarmament talks component of the dual track decision was also 
seen as being of immense importance.17  European leaders were hence under pressure 
to go on talking to the Soviets rather than shunning direct dialogue.  Schmidt thus 
welcomed Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, to Germany in November 198118; 
Giscard d’Estaing visited the Soviet Union in May 198019; and Mitterrand travelled to 
the Soviet Union to meet Konstantin Chernenko, the new Soviet leader, in 1984, did 
so again less than a year later to attend Chernenko’s funeral and to have talks with 
Mikhail Gorbachev and other Politburo members, and in October 1985 became the 
first Western leader to be visited by Gorbachev since he had become General 
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Secretary.20  Margaret Thatcher also attended Chernenko’s funeral, having previously 
met Gorbachev when he travelled to London in December 1984.21  And such 
contrasting attitudes towards top-level dialogue were emblematic of a more general 
divergence of attitudes towards how to behave vis-à-vis Moscow.  Schmidt was 
representative of a much more generalised European attitude when he told the US 
Ambassador in December 1981 that ‘The way to deal with Moscow is not… by 
speeches and interviews.  These… are not read by the Soviets.  Moscow must be dealt 
with quietly.’22  Face to face dialogue, not long-distance rhetorical broadsides, was 
the key policy tool in dealing with the Soviet Union. 
 Actual policy divergence was moreover amplified by the very different public 
debates on either side of the Atlantic.  Personal relations between Reagan and his 
European counterparts were often quite good.  Schmidt for instance was highly 
commendatory of Reagan’s performance in the aftermath of the Ottawa G7 summit in 
July 1981, letting it be known to the US Embassy in Bonn that ‘He likes the President 
as a person, understands what he is trying to do, and is sympathetic to him.’23  The 
same telegram noted that the mood in London about the summit was even more 
euphoric.  And there is plenty of other evidence of the close personal rapport that 
quickly developed between Thatcher and the President. 24 But in neither Britain nor 
Germany did the personal warmth between the national leader and the US President 
easily translate into more general public sympathy for the new American leader.  
Instead, the image of Reagan as a reckless and somewhat shallow former B-movie 
actor who knew little about international affairs and was prepared to take ill-judged 
risks with the security of the world in general and Europe in particular, was fortified 
by the sound-bites from America’s own much more hardline debate about the cold 
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war that drifted over the Atlantic.25  Gaffes such as the President’s 1982 comments 
into what he supposedly thought was an inactive microphone: ‘My fellow Americans, 
I'm pleased to tell you today that I've signed legislation that will outlaw Russia 
forever. We begin bombing in five minutes’ only made matters worse.26  The famous 
mock up Gone With the Wind poster produced by the peace movement of Reagan as 
Rhett Butler holding Thatcher as Scarlett O’Hara in his arms against a backdrop of a 
mushroom cloud, complete with the tag line ‘She promised to follow him to the end 
of the earth.  He promised to organise it!’ was perhaps an extreme example of 
European anxieties.27  But as a number of telegrams from both the US embassy in 
London and that in Bonn illustrate, fears that anti-American sentiment was growing 
across Western Europe were taken very seriously by US diplomats.  A March 1982 
dispatch from London summarised the problem: ‘The upshot is that we no longer 
enjoy the benefit of the doubt in Britain – or we suspect elsewhere in Europe.  On the 
contrary, our every move is scrutinized for evidence that we are using our power 
irresponsibly.’28 
 In such circumstances, European leaders found it very hard to look favourably 
upon US urgings that their countries adopt hard line cold war stances, especially when 
to do so would be both financially and politically expensive.  This was true of the 
debate about NATO rearmament where US pressure for a generalised arms build up 
was a source of discomfort for those such as Schmidt who were conscious of the high 
political price that was already being paid within the ruling SPD party in particular in 
order to get the dual track decision through, and acutely aware of the budgetary 
constraints faced by even a comparatively well performing European economy like 
that of West Germany.  The pained (if discreet) reaction of the German government to 
the US announcement that it intended to resume production of neutron bomb 
warheads underlined the ongoing political sensitivity of the whole rearmament debate 
in West Germany and Western Europe more generally.29  And European discomfort 
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18.8.1981.  To understand quite why the whole neutron bomb question was quite so sensitive in 
was even greater in response to the recurrent US pressure to punish the Soviet Union 
for episodes such as the declaration of Martial Law in Poland by means of restrictions 
in economic interchange across the Iron Curtain.  The most notorious such 
controversy, that surrounding the American attempt to impede West European 
companies supplying components to the gas pipeline running from the Soviet Europe 
to Western Europe, is the subject of a separate chapter elsewhere in this volume.  But 
the pipeline affair was only one of a succession of Transatlantic rows.  In each the US 
desire to avoid economic transfers that might provide solace to a struggling Soviet 
economy and the interruption of which would also be a highly visible sign of Western 
disapproval of Soviet actions, collided head on with not only a European belief that 
trade was a sign of healthy East-West relations, but also an understandable 
apprehension about forsaking commercial opportunities at a time when all of the 
economies of the region were underperforming.30  The fact that most Western 
European countries had also built up much more intensive commercial ties with 
Eastern Europe than had the United States also meant that Germany, France or Britain 
had much more to lose from any recourse to economic sanctions as a form of cold war 
pressure.  As table 1 demonstrates, all four of the larger Western European power did 
significantly more business with Eastern Europe than did the United States; forfeiting 
or even endangering such contacts in the name of Western solidarity was hence not an 
easy step to take at a time of generalised economic gloom. 
 
US$ millions 
1980 
Imports from  
Comecon 
% of Total 
 Imports  
Exports to 
Comecon 
% of Total  
Exports 
United States 1483 0.59 3844 1.8 
France 5325 3.96 4971 4.48 
FRG 8575 4.61 9568 4.99 
Great Britain 2133 1.8 2545 2.2 
Italy 5290 5.37 2824 3.59 
Table 1. Trade with Eastern Bloc.  (Based upon OECD Statistics of Foreign 
Trade, Series B, 1980 (Paris: OECD, 1981)) 
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 All told therefore the early Reagan years were an era characterised by a degree 
of Transatlantic discord.  The standard account is therefore largely confirmed by the 
first wave of archival evidence.  But what the archives also reveal is that 
notwithstanding the multiple tactical disagreements that arose between the United 
States and its principal European allies in this period, the underlying mechanisms of 
the Transatlantic relationship continued to run quite smoothly.  The second main 
section of this chapter will thus seek to demonstrate what went on working despite the 
rows outlined above. 
 
A working relationship 
A decade earlier the situation had been very different.  Disagreements in the late 
1960s and early 1970s between the US and the main Western European powers had 
helped fuel Europe’s quest to develop a multilateral mechanism for coordinating 
foreign policy amongst the European Community member states and had coloured the 
initial American response to the launch of European Political Cooperation (EPC).31  
Washington had not tried to obstruct Europe’s attempt to coordinate its members’ 
foreign policy stances directly.  But Henry Kissinger had struggled to conceal his 
disdain for the inevitable slowness of multilateral foreign policy coordination and had 
made clear his annoyance at being obliged to speak to European spokemen who not 
only came from small countries (Denmark held the EC presidency when the first EPC 
positions on Transatlantic affairs were communicated to Washington) but were also 
not empowered to negotiate, only inform.32  Kissinger had also been involved in a 
heavy-handed attempt to insist that the US be consulted at an early stage of EPC 
deliberations, and had reacted with anger to the initial European attempts to outline a 
policy towards the Middle East.33  Disagreement about substance – in particular the 
belief that most European governments were too pro-Arab and too committed to 
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multilateral détente with the Soviets – had thus blended dangerously with US 
disapprobation of Europe’s fledgling foreign policy coordination mechanisms.  
Kissinger’s famous and tactless Year of Europe speech in which he differentiated 
between the United States and its global concerns, and Europe and its purely regional 
ones, was only the most public manifestation of a strongly held belief that Europe 
should not seek to involve itself collectively in matters that were best handled 
unilaterally by the United States.34 
 By the early 1980s, however, the United States seemed to have come to terms 
with the EC’s attempts to exercise some influence in the field of foreign policy and to 
have established a pattern of practical, day-to-day cooperation with the EPC 
structures.  The change was perhaps most obvious in the case of Middle Eastern 
diplomacy – the field in which, a decade earlier, the Americans had been most 
outspoken in their criticism of European intervention.  Thus, in the autumn of 1981, 
the US Embassy in London kept in close touch with the British EC Presidency about 
the discussions underway in the EPC about the involvement of four European 
countries in the planned Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) designed to 
oversee the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord signed at Camp David.35  Eight years earlier 
by contrast Kissinger had gone out of his way to ensure that no European Community 
countries were invited to participate in the UN Emergency Force established to police 
the 1973 cease-fire.36  The American documents do suggest admittedly that some 
level of Israeli discomfort remained about the overall European approach to the 
situation in the Middle East.  But whereas in the early 1970s such Israeli misgivings 
had only magnified the United States’ own unhappiness at the European role, in the 
early 1980s the Americans were actively involved in seeking to calm Israel’s anxieties 
and arguing strongly for a European role.37  In similar fashion, Washington welcomed 
European activism in some of the most contentious East-West issues of the era, 
Alexander Haig, the Secretary of State, briefing the President before his meeting with 
Peter Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary that ‘We strongly support the British-
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led EC initiative on Afghanistan.’38  And even over Poland where undoubted 
differences of approach did emerge between Washington and many of the Western 
European countries involved, this divergence did not reflect a US failure to engage 
with the complex machinery of European foreign policy making.   Rather the reverse: 
in the weeks immediately after the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 
1981, the United States government not only lobbied each of the four largest EC 
states directly but also invited all ten EC ambassadors in Washington to a lunch with 
the Secretary of State designed to stiffen the collective position of their countries.39 
 All of this does rather suggest that historians working on Transatlantic 
relations in the 1980s need to move beyond the usual consensus that the EPC process 
was disappointing and largely ineffective.  The first decade of foreign policy 
coordination amongst the Nine (and then the Ten) had not had the revolutionary 
effects that some of the early rhetoric about European emancipation from the United 
States had suggested.  The apogee of belief that Europe might soon be able to behave 
in a tightly coordinated fashion on a global level, and maintain its unity whether 
dealing with cold war enemies or close allies like the US, which had been reached at 
Copenhagen at the end of 1973, had not endured.40  Instead the realisation had sunk in 
that in matters Transatlantic especially, bilateral exchanges with Washington would 
remain as important if not more so than any internal-European coordination.41  But 
neither had it been a total failure.  Instead, the European member states had built up a 
pattern of low-key, but useful cooperation on many of the key foreign policy issues of 
the day – and this manner of working had been accepted as part of the diplomatic 
landscape by most of Europe’s international interlocutors, and the United States in 
particular.  In many instances, admittedly, the EPC process resulted only in words of 
condemnation rather than action.  But as examples from the early 1980s ranging from 
the Polish crisis to the Falklands War demonstrate, the mechanism could at times 
enable the EC to flank strong words with limited economic sanctions and other 
punitive measures. 
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 From a US perspective the emergence of the EPC process did not require too 
sharp a change in its modus operandi towards Europe.  Washington had always tried 
to conduct most of its diplomacy towards Western Europe through bilateral 
discussions with the leading European powers.  This remained a largely effective 
tactic under EPC rules, since frequent US exchanges with Europe’s three largest 
powers (Britain, France and Germany), plus sometimes the Italians and whichever 
state held the EC’s rotating Presidency, would normally suffice to remain fully in 
touch with whatever was being talked about amongst the Nine or Ten, and to enable 
the Americans to exercise quite a strong degree of influence over the outcome of the 
multilateral European discussions.  Furthermore, at a time like the 1980s when the 
principal US concern about Europe was not the danger of overactive European 
diplomacy – the issue that seems at times to have worried Kissinger - but rather the 
prospect of too anaemic a response by the Europeans to the key foreign policy issues 
of the day, any mechanism that might help encourage Europe to do more in the 
foreign policy field was generally to be welcomed.   The whole tone of an October 
1981 message from Haig to Carrington was highly revealing in this respect, since the 
US Secretary of State was quite open about the differences that existed between the 
US and European positions vis-à-vis the Middle East, but emphasised the American 
desire to see Europe engaged in the process: ‘Let me assure you, Peter, in handling 
this issue we will be very careful in our public and private comments not to 
characterize EC participation as anything over than support for the treaty of peace.  
We certainly will not characterize it as an EC underwriting of the whole Camp David 
process.  Let us agree to disagree about the essential if there is to be a peace process 
in any form.’ But the key was that the EC reached a position which would enable 
European member states to participate in the MFO. 42 
 The first wave of archival releases does therefore suggest a greater role for the 
EPC in Transatlantic dialogue during this era than might perhaps have been expected.  
Europe had certainly not acquired the single telephone number of which Kissinger 
was reputed to have spoken.  On the contrary, bilateral relationships between the US 
leadership and the governments of each of the main European countries continued to 
matter greatly.  The American need to exercise influence over multilateral European 
deliberations had indeed only added yet one more subject to the already lengthy 
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agenda of transatlantic dialogue between Washington and the principal European 
capitals.   But the Americans clearly did pay some heed to what emerged from the 
EPC process and regarded the mechanism as having some utility in terms of fostering 
Western unity.  A comprehensive review of Transatlantic relations during this era will 
therefore have to flank its discussion of evolving US-German, US-French or Anglo-
American relations, with an investigation of how much influence the Americans were 
able to wield over Europe’s laborious but sometimes surprisingly effective search for 
foreign policy coordination.  
 
A very multi-layered relationship 
A second general point that needs to be made about Transatlantic relations in the early 
1980s and which emerges partly from the analysis above, is to emphasize the 
enormous institutional complexity of links between Western Europe and North 
America during this period.  International historians of the post-1945 period have long 
grown accustomed to navigating their way across a Western terrain full of those 
multiple institutions established in the first decade and a half after the end of the 
Second World War.  Some of these institutions were global, like the United Nations 
structures.  Others encompassed just the western world: the Bretton Woods 
institutions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).  
And still others were specifically Western European such as the Council of Europe, 
the European Communities, and their looser outlying rival and shadow, the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA).  An extensive historiography has grown up about 
many of their origins.43  There is also a smaller, less well-known, literature which 
charts the course of an earlier wave of international institution building which 
occurred during the interwar years, primarily although not exclusively centred on the 
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League of Nations.44  A number of these bodies had survived the demise during the 
Second World War of their parent institution.  Only just beginning to be seriously 
studied by contrast is a third major wave of institution building that occurred during 
the 1960s and 1970s and which saw fairly extensive change at global, Western and 
European levels.   Thus at a global level, international economic power relationships 
were challenged, if not yet fundamentally altered by the rise of a southern challenge 
to the global predominance of the industrialised powers of the northern hemisphere.  
This was expressed through new structures such as United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Conference on International Economic 
Cooperation (CIEC), better known as the North-South dialogue.45  In Western terms a 
new, more hierarchical series of structures developed during much the same period, 
reflecting a desire by the larger powers to increase their control amidst severe global 
economic crisis.  The most formalised of these new entities was the G5, later G6, and 
then G7, which brought together the world’s major western economies46; less 
structured, but equally significant, was the emergence during the Ford administration 
period of a pattern of routine consultation on most foreign policy issues between 
Washington and the three largest European powers, West Germany, France and 
Britain.  Kissinger referred to this at one point as ‘a de facto political steering group’, 
but for reasons of tact, few other chose to use this name or the still more inflammatory 
term of ‘directorate’.47  The pattern of meetings and multiple four-way exchanges of 
telegrams and messages, however, persisted from the short-lived Ford Presidency, 
through the Carter years, and into the Reagan era.  And at a European level, this era of 
institution building saw the development not just of pan-European bodies, spanning 
the cold war division of the continent, like the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), but also of a whole new generation of European 
Community connected structures.  Most important of these was the birth of the 
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European Council in 1975, but also of some significance for Transatlantic interchange 
was the development of the EPC process alluded to earlier, not to mention the start of 
institutionalised monetary cooperation in Europe through the European Monetary 
System (EMS).48 
 All of this meant that by the 1980s, cooperation between Western Europe and 
the United States was carried out through an unprecedentedly thick layer of 
multilateral structures.  To take but one practical example, the western reaction to the 
December 1981 imposition of Martial Law in Poland brought into play a plethora of 
institutions, traceable back to all three waves of international institutionalisation.  At 
perhaps the most obvious level, both NATO and the Community structures, including 
the various EPC fora, sprang into action, as western powers sought, not without 
difficulty, to devise a common stance.49  Formal meetings of this sort were flanked 
not just by Haig’s attempt to lobby more informally the assembled ambassadors of the 
Ten, referred to above, but also by an extensive mobilisation of the pattern of US 
exchanges with the European big four (the Italians were included on this occasion).  
In mid-January for instance Haig despatched broadly similar, but subtly different 
messages to Genscher, Carrington, Claude Cheysson and Emilio Colombo.50  The 
British and German messages for instance started rather differently, with Carrington 
being praised for his efforts to stiffen the stance of the Ten, and Genscher criticised 
for the hesitations which his country had shown about too firm a line on Poland, but 
soon converged on an identical text underlining the importance of continuing Western 
forcefulness on this issue.  A subsequent State Department telegram also referred 
explicitly to the US hope that ‘that quadripartite consultations and cooperation will 
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continue to be a key element in determining Western policy in the Polish situation.’51 
Outside the confines of purely Western coordination, meanwhile, American and 
European representatives took full advantage of global structures like the UN and 
pan-European bodies such as the CSCE follow-up conference underway in Madrid 
publicly to denounce General Jaruzelski’s move and to condemn the Soviet Union as 
primarily responsible for the crack down.  At IMF level meanwhile, Poland’s hopes of 
joining the organisation were deep frozen because of the declaration of Martial Law.  
And even some of the surviving interwar creations were mobilised to the cause, the 
Americans and West Europeans agreeing to try to use the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) as a channel through which to retain links with the Solidarnosc 
trade union in Poland and thereby make possible an ongoing dialogue with opposition 
forces within the Eastern bloc.52 
 Few of these multiple Western actions seem to have proved particularly 
effective in the short term at least.  Martial law would eventually be lifted in January 
1983.  But a full restoration of dialogue between the ruling Communist party and the 
opposition would have to await the second half of the decade.  Nor is it at all clear 
how important a factor international pressure proved in bringing about these 
developments.53  Of rather greater relevance to a chapter focusing on the West-West 
dynamics of the period in question, though, is the hugely multi-faceted and complex 
nature of the international response.  In the type of crisis which would once have 
triggered purely unilateral reactions by individual great powers, the Western response 
by the early 1980s had become something that was organised, coordinated and 
mediated through a wide array of interlinked and overlapping international structures. 
 As a result any historian seeking to reconstruct completely the international 
political history of this period cannot restrict themselves just to the key bilateral 
relationships, however fascinating these might be.  Nor is it safe to study one single 
international institution in isolation, focusing solely on NATO for instance or the 
IMF.  Instead, the historian needs to be aware of the interplay between all these 
                                                 
51
 RRPL, NSC Country Files, Box 14, Folder FRG 1/1/1982-30/9/82 (5/11), State to Bonn, Paris & 
London 714, 2.1.1982 
52
 The use of all of these fora is discussed in RRPL, NSC Country Files, Box 14, Folder FRG 1/1/1982-
30/9/82 (5/11), State to Bonn, Paris & London 714, 2.1.1982; see also Selvage, ‘The politics of a lesser 
evil’ & Sarah Snyder, ‘The CSCE and the Atlantic Alliance: Forging a new consensus in Madrid’, 
Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 8/1 (2010), pp.61-2 
53
 See Gregory F. Domber, ‘Rumblings in Eastern Europe: Western pressure on Poland’s moves 
towards democratic transformation’ in Bozo (ed.), Europe and the End of the Cold War, pp.51-3 
different layers of diplomacy and interdependence, to take account of how rows in 
one forum might or might not spill over into other seeming unrelated discussions in a 
different institutional setting,  and to trace action and inaction from one type of 
international organisation to another.  They also need to develop both a strong 
stomach for seemingly arcane rows about why one institutional forum might be 
preferable for a given action than another – witness for example the lengthy debate 
between Haig and Genscher in 1982 about whether the Americans’ campaign to limit 
the export credits Western governments accorded to companies wishing to sell to the 
Soviet Union should be something dealt with inside or outside of the OECD54 – and 
good antennae as to how a seemingly innocuous decision to change the institutional 
setting might in fact be a serious change of policy. 
Traditional big personality history connected to the ups and downs of 
relationships between Reagan, Thatcher, Schmidt, Kohl, Mitterrand or Giuliano 
Andreotti will continue to have both its relevance and its obvious appeal.  Indeed in 
an era when summitry, both bilateral and multilateral had become more realistic and 
more frequent thanks to easy air travel and a greater readiness by many of the key 
leaders to speak to one another by telephone, such personal relationships arguably 
mattered more than ever before.  But those who are drawn to the good quotes and the 
intriguing personalities of the top level encounters need at very least to be aware of 
the way in which the patterns of change that can be observed at summit level could be 
both magnified and tempered in all of the other different levels of interconnection 
amongst the principal Western powers.  Harmony or discord at the highest level did 
not, in other words, necessarily translate directly into similar patterns at all levels of 
each intergovernmental relationship, nor did alterations in the bilateral relationship 
inevitably feed through unchanged into the many multilateral fora within which the 
major powers interacted.  Rather, Transatlantic relations had become ever-more 
complicated, with somewhat different dynamics at work in each of the different 
contexts within which Western governments interacted.  To a large degree this was of 
course a source of strength, not one of weakness.  It meant, for instance, that even a 
very poor relationship between leaders was unlikely entirely to undermine links 
between each Western power.  But the depth and the multifaceted nature of 
Transatlantic ties and the complexity of the institutional web that bound the West 
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together does make the task of any historical analyst seeking to chart the evolution of 
US-European relations immeasurably more challenging. 
 
European over-representation 
A third point that becomes evident once the full degree of interaction between 
Western Europe and the United States is considered is that the repeated European 
complaints about their lack of influence in Washington during this period need to be 
viewed with a degree of scepticism.  The Reagan administration certainly did not 
always act as Europeans would have wanted it to.  And as the opening section of this 
chapter underlined, there were no shortage of spats and disputes between Washington 
and its main European allies during this period, whether over economic policy or the 
conduct of the cold war.  But such misunderstandings were not the product of an 
alliance that was becoming structurally less conducive to European influence in 
Washington.  On the contrary, the institutional architecture of the early 1980s was 
such as to give Western Europeans a greater voice in America than in any previous 
post-1945 period of Transatlantic relations. 
 The potential scope for European influence was probably most obvious at the 
level of G7 global summitry.  In an era much characterised by doom and gloom about 
Europe’s economic weakness, it was already perhaps remarkable that four out of the 
seven participants at such meetings were European leaders, representing Germany, 
France, Britain and Italy.  But the European presence was not limited to just these 
four, since from 1977 onwards the President of the European Commission won the 
right to be present also, lifting the number of Europeans to five.55  And by 1982, the 
practice had developed of the European Community Presidency also being 
represented, which meant that at those times when the rotating six month post was not 
held by one of the big four leaders who attended global summits in their own right – 
i.e. about half of the time in a Community of Ten - yet another European leader would 
be added to the roll-call.56   It was hence often the case that US President and the 
Japanese and Canadian Prime Ministers would be flanked by no fewer than six 
European counterparts, turning supposedly global summits into surprisingly European 
affairs. 
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 The prominence of European representatives was replicated in a range of other 
international organisations.  Britain and France remained the most valuable allies of 
the US in any UN based discussion, given their status as the ‘other two’ Western 
permanent members of the Security Council, and their ongoing links with their former 
colonies scattered across the globe.  At least one further Western European country 
was also likely to feature on the roster of elected Security Council members at any 
given moment.  Western Europe supplied the majority of members to the OECD.  
Most major rounds of discussion within the GATT had been dominated by an 
American-EC duopoly since the Kennedy Round of the 1960s.57  The Uruguay Round 
which began in 1986 would only confirm this pattern.  And the IMF, although re-
inventing itself in the new era of floating exchange rates as a body which was more 
likely to intervene in debt crises in the developing world than to host discussions of 
economic coordination amongst the leading richer nations, retained both a scale of 
European voting weight and an unwritten convention that its Secretary General should 
be a Western European that harked back to an earlier era and its earlier role. 
There was a similarly pronounced European flavour to US consultations with 
its allies about major foreign policy issues during this period.  A detailed study of the 
Reagan files would no doubt reveal quite an intensive pattern of bilateral exchanges 
with major partners in East Asia, Oceania or Latin America.  It is unlikely, however, 
that any such dialogue matched the intensity, complexity and range of subject of 
American-West European exchanges, and particularly the systematic pattern of 
consultation with the Britain, France and Germany (plus sometimes Italy) that was 
mentioned above.  In part this reflected the fact that developments within Europe still 
mattered greatly, whether economically or geo-strategically, to the United States.  
Washington still cared about what happened in Europe and had to engage with the 
region’s principal actors as a result. In part, it sprang from the European role in the 
various international fora listed earlier.  If the US was to accomplish anything within 
the world’s assorted collective bodies, recruiting the major European powers as allies 
and co-sponsors made good tactical sense.  Likewise, avoiding a situation in which 
US actions were actively opposed by the leading European players was a strategic 
necessity in the UN, GATT, IMF or whatever.  But most fundamentally of all it 
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reflected the reality that in the 1980s no group of countries other than Western Europe 
combined the basic similarity of values, ideology and economic outlook to the US, the 
wealth and diplomatic willingness to play an active role outside their own region, and 
the resources and the self-confidence to trade ideas about how global politics should 
be conducted.  Whether the issue was how to consolidate the fragile peace between 
Egypt and Israel, how to mobilise resources for the stabilisation of southern Africa, or 
how to isolate and denounce a country such as Sandinista-led Nicaragua, 
Washington’s desire for and efforts to mobilise Western European support emerges 
with great clarity from the Reagan library files.   
Naturally neither the intensity of the bilateral consultations between 
Washington and its European partners, nor the over-representation of Europe in many 
global institutional settings guaranteed that the Americans would heed European 
advice, counsel or special-pleading.  The first half of the 1980s thus featured repeated 
instances of Reagan’s administration acting in a fashion that entirely disregarded what 
America’s European allies had called for.  This was as true in the economic field – as 
over interest rates or the value of the dollar – as it was over cold war issues, from 
regional crises over Libya and Grenada to Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, or 
‘Star Wars’ programme.58  Nor was there any certainty that the Western Europeans 
would be able to maximise the effectiveness of their bilateral and multilateral linkages 
by coordinating their positions and speaking with similar voices in their exchanges 
with Washington.  Again there are many examples from the period of Western Europe 
allowing itself to be marginalised partly because the coordinating mechanisms of the 
EC and the EPC proved unable to reconcile highly divergent national stances.  It was 
often the case that Washington did not have to resort to divide et impera tactics even 
had it wanted to, since European countries were all too prone to squabble amongst 
themselves over economic or foreign policy issues even without an outside 
superpower encouraging such divisions. 
 As the decade progressed, however, and the European integration process 
moved from the doldrums of the early part of the 1980s to the post-1985 relaunch and 
revival, the ability of Western European countries to coordinate their stance, on 
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economic issues especially, improved significantly.59  Furthermore, throughout the 
period, Western European countries continued to enjoy an unrivalled network of 
informal contacts and linkages with the United States, of the sort discussed in Giles 
Scott-Smith’s contribution to the volume.  This Transatlantic web of personal ties, 
informal networks, and multiple levels of social and commercial interaction, also 
increased the likelihood of European view-points being heard, if not necessarily 
heeded, in policy debate within the US capital.  Informal persuasion and pressure 
complemented the multiple official mechanisms through which Western Europeans 
could seek to influence the western Superpower.  As a result, it is reasonable to 
identify the 1980s as a period when Western Europe enjoyed a level of influence and 
representation within Washington that was vastly disproportionate to the continent’s 
size (or even its global share of wealth) and that was entirely out of step with the 
mood of self-doubt and self-deprecation that often characterised European rhetoric of 
the era.  Regretting Western Europe’s global powerlessness was a characteristic 
widespread amongst Europe’s political and intellectual elite; the objective realities of 
the era, however, suggest that the 1980s were instead a time when Western Europe 
continued to enjoy a remarkable and in many ways aberrant level of influence over 
Washington.   
 
Conclusions 
Able to look back at the period as a whole, the historian does thus need to avoid being 
wholly taken in by the torrent of European lamentation about global marginalisation.  
Western Europe did not always get its way with Reagan’s America.  Indeed, as the 
first part of this chapter recalled, the 1980s were to see multiple policy disputes 
between the two sides of the Atlantic over global economic governance as much as 
about the conduct of the East-West conflict. It is also the case that the period did see 
Western Europe’s competitive position eroded in vital economic sectors, vis-à-vis 
both the US and Japan.  Over time this would lessen Western Europe’s global 
centrality and its ability to influence US policy, although it was a trend that would be 
powerfully counteracted in the latter half of the 1980s by the revitalisation of the 
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European integration process and the deepening and widening of the EC.  And in the 
long-run a series of deeper cultural, demographic, economic and geopolitical factors 
could also be identified that were gradually leading the Americans to look towards the 
Pacific as much as they looked to Atlantic.  The contemporary economic strength of 
Japan and the Asian ‘tigers’ and the longer term potential of China both pointed in 
this direction. But at the same time 1980s Western Europe retained a huge degree of 
leverage over the Americans and was able to bring its viewpoint(s) to the attention of 
US decision makers in a fashion scarcely dreamt of elsewhere and hardly replicated in 
earlier periods of the cold war.  For all the alarmism about Western and Atlantic 
decline and for all the rhetoric about deep misunderstanding between Reagan’s 
America and his European counterparts, the 1980s were in a sense the apogee of 
Atlantic cooperation.  It was therefore perhaps appropriate that they were a decade 
that would culminate in a major geo-political transformation, the ending of the cold 
war, which was profoundly European and Atlantic in character.   
